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Abstract 
Theorists have argued that environmental justice requires more than just the fair distribution of 
environmental benefits and harms. It also requires participation in environmental decisions of those 
affected by them, and equal recognition of their cultural identities, dimensions most clearly articulated 
in relation to indigenous struggles, where past devaluation of place-based cultural identities is seen as a 
source of injustice. I argue for an alternative concept of environmental justice that draws on accounts of 
how attachment (and place attachment specifically) is constitutive for both self-efficacy and collective 
agency in the face of an intrinsically uncertain future.  Drawing on the work of Peter Marris and using a 
case study of UK gas pipeline infrastructure,  I show how disruption to attachments also disrupts lived 
strategies for dealing with an uncertain future. The source of injustice involved in such disruption 
should be viewed as the ‘colonisation of attachment’. 
Keywords: attachment; environmental justice; insecurity; lived future; place attachment; uncertainty 
Introduction 
Environmental justice is about more than just how the benefits and harms of development are shared out. 
Scholars working with groups campaigning for environmental justice have noted that they often demand the 
right to participate in decisions that affect them, and to have historical denigrations of their cultural 
traditions recognised. David Schlosberg, drawing on Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young, has argued that 
empirical study of indigenous movements suggests that we should broaden our conceptions of justice. 
Claims on recognition, he argues, arise from how planning and siting decisions erode the collective agency 
of populations linked by their cultural traditions to the land (Schlosberg, 2004). Environmental justice 
therefore points to the moral and political significance of the constitutive relationships between individual 
and collective capabilities, and also between human capabilities and the biophysical world (Schlosberg, 
2013). If demands for such relationships to be recognised challenge the dominance of distributive 
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conceptions of justice, environmental justice also foregrounds the importance of places to understanding the 
spatial and cultural dimensions of environmental justice (Walker, 2012). 
 
Demands for environmental justice are not only made by indigenous peoples, however. Inhabitants of 
communities affected by land-use decisions more widely also frame their activism in terms of complex links 
between everyday experiences of socio-environmental degradation and place attachment (Burningham and 
Thrush, 2003). The processes of colonisation from which indigenous peoples have suffered have their 
counterpart in siting and management decisions, the consequences of which emerge over time and across 
space, producing a range of inequalities that transform places inhabited by non-indigenous communities into 
‘faulty environments’ (Irwin and Simmons, 1999). Such communities become subject to emergent 
vulnerabilities thanks to the stigmatisation of their localities, which in turn tends to attract more stigmatising 
infrastructure (Walker, 2009: 626). 
 
Wherever claims of environmental injustice arise from, they are associated with the effects of land-use 
decisions on identity and the capacity of communities to shape their own futures at least as much as with 
specific distributional health or economic effects (Gregory and Satterfield, 2002). Here, I argue that 
explorations of environmental justice as encompassing procedural and recognition aspects need to go further 
to make sense of what is at stake.  I propose that connections between place, identity and agency need to be 
interpreted through aspects of attachment theory that identify attachment as a process and relationship that 
undergirds individual and collective capacities for making sense of and influencing intrinsically uncertain 
individual and collective futures. Place attachment is therefore positioned as a constitutive element of 
agency, a capability in Sen and Nussbaum’s sense, as discussed by Schlosberg and Carruthers (2010). 
Injustice, then, must be defined in terms of what Young (1990) identifies as oppression and domination – the 
denial of active capabilities of self-definition and self-determination. This denial, I propose, occurs through 
the ‘colonisation of attachment’, whether those affected are indigenous or non-indigenous. By 
‘colonisation’, I mean a failure or refusal on the part of developers and decision-makers to recognise 
constitutive values, but also the ways in which the governance of environmental conflicts often constrains 
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those who raise claims of injustice into representing and defending their own interests in a manner that ends 
up harming them.  
 
After setting out in the next section the theoretical basis for my position, I explore the colonisation of 
attachment using empirical research into community-based campaigns against energy infrastructure in South 
Wales and Gloucestershire in the UK. I show how the disruption of place attachment through processes such 
as  stigmatisation can undermine individual and collective strategies for dealing with uncertainty, an effect 
encapsulated within two metaphors used by interviewees to talk about a major gas pipeline: the ‘bomb in my 
backyard’ and the ‘serpent in my house’. 
 
Analytical framework 
Beyond distributive justice, at least two other dimensions of justice have been articulated by advocates of 
environmental justice. The first is that those affected by land-use decisions should have effective voice in 
these decisions, which opens up questions regarding exactly who (across a range of temporal and spatial 
scales) is affected by them (Bristow et al, 2012). The second is that there should be public recognition of the 
effects of the degradation of environments and the stigmatisation of places on identity, on agency and thus 
upon the well-being (in a more eudaimonistic sense) of the people who inhabit them (Schlosberg, 2004). 
Further, a lack of participation and recognition often allows distributive injustices to continue. More than a 
distributive concept of justice is therefore needed to understand what is at stake in environmental justice 
conflicts.  
 
In this section, I set out a framework to help understand how place attachment is linked to embedded agency 
and how this link underlies environmental injustices in relation to recognition. This takes us into 
considerations of attachment as a capability, not a passive bond. In this sense, attachment weaves together 
place, identity and agency in helping to domesticate, for individuals and the collectivities of which they are 
part, an intrinsically uncertain future. This capability forms the connective tissue of ‘ecological citizenship’ 
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(Latta, 2007), a citizenship that challenges classical liberal understandings of citizenship by recognising the 
embeddedness of political and moral agents in the material, biophysical world (Rose, 2007). Claims of 
environmental injustice point towards failures to recognise the existence of this form of citizenship. 
 
The value of attachment: identity and agency 
Attachment is a capability through which intersubjectivity emerges. Though part of how an infant’s material 
needs are provided for, its primary value lies in how it helps give shape to the future for the individual 
subject. It creates anticipations and expectations, with good attachment creating a ‘secure space’ that 
underlies a developing child’s creativity and capacity to take risks (Bretherton, 1992). Playful, tender and 
consistent interaction with caregivers helps culture the self-efficacy and subjective agency of the child, 
which initially takes the form of an infant’s capacity to regulate its emotions of distress (Stern, 1985).  
 
Attachment’s primary value therefore lies in taming an intrinsically uncertain future, a concern which is 
perhaps as close to universally human as we can get (Jackson, 1989: 15-17), by creating a secure 
intersubjective space. Within this space, progressively more complex and integrated forms of agency, along 
with accompanying models of the self, can be actualised. Sociologist Peter Marris (1996) points out that this 
achievement always takes place from within a lifeworld of attachments that is also social and historical, and 
extends beyond simply interpersonal relationships. Attachments through the lifecourse may include relations 
to places, non-humans, objects, social institutions and even ideals, all individual objects that may be of 
widely-shared importance. These create webs of interdependence that extend across the social field and also 
into the biophysical world. In this sense, a ‘secure space’ is more than just the ‘ontological security’ 
(Giddens, 1991) of the individual. Nor does it imply that subjectivity is conceived of as inward-looking and 
continually seeking safety, as some have insisted (e.g. Miller, 2008). Instead, it is a relational, temporalized 
space, which guides agency by providing armatures of habits and expectations, together with their emotional 
accompaniments, without determining it. It constitutes a ‘lived future’ (Adam and Groves, 2007), in the 
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sense of a future that is latent in the materiality of the environment, as well as being projected through the 
dispositions, attitudes, beliefs and practices that are embedded within that environment. 
 
A significant consequence of this complex relationship between attachment and subjectivity is that what 
happens to attachments can enhance or harm agency and identity.  Social-psychological literature on place 
attachment demonstrates how the embeddedness of identity and agency in attachment relationships 
manifests itself in the specific case of places, and shows how changes in place attachment can affect, over 
time, individuals’ agency and self-concepts, as well as the meanings of place and forms of agency shared 
among collectives. Individual place attachment rests on biography and memory, which shape identity 
(Twigger-Ross and Uzzell, 1996). It is also shaped by experience-in-place (Manzo, 2005), in which shared 
meanings are incorporated in an individual’s sense of place (Altman and Low, 1992). Place attachment 
further shapes agency in the form of self-efficacy (Breakwell, 1992), i.e. the assurance that one is situated 
within a ‘manageable environment’ that one can influence. The contribution of place attachment to self-
efficacy is evident in emotional self-regulation but also in cognitive processes (Scannell and Gifford, 2010).  
 
These contributions of place attachment are conditional, however, on the continuing character of places 
themselves. Places’ physical characteristics are important in shaping affective responses, as attachments to 
lakes, parks, forests and so on demonstrate (Manzo, 2003). Trust in others and trust in place as reliable 
supports for one’s way of life are often linked (Edelstein, 2004a). Changes to the character of place, through 
development or disasters (whether natural or human-caused) can therefore affect self-concepts and self-
efficacy through changes to the quality of attachment, which may become negative or ambivalent (Manzo, 
2003). Processes of stigmatisation and their effects on the shared and individual meanings of places have 
been widely studied as sources of shifts in place qualities (Sims et al., 2009; Broto et al., 2010), as have the 
direct effects of noise, pollution and other phenomena on the practices and expectations that characterise 
place attachment relationships (Edelstein, 2004b: 234).  
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Although individuals may respond to disruptions to place attachment in very different ways, such 
disruptions are not therefore experienced solely as part of an individual lifeworld. They are events which are 
responded to through collective sense-making (Irwin and Simmons, 1999). Such responses have been 
interpreted as attempt to rescue valued identities and effective forms of agency embedded in particular 
places from being lost (Hillier, 1999). If place attachment is a capability that enables identity and agency, 
then the loss of this capability may lead to a loss of identity and agency.  
 
Attachment and harm 
If significant attachments are eroded or lost, the result is a particular form of harm. Whereas Sen and 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (e.g. Nussbaum, 2003) refers ultimately to capabilities as the possessions 
of individuals, Marris (1996) stresses that attachment is a capability that exists only relationally. Place 
attachment, for example, is a capability possessed by individual agents only by virtue of their embeddedness 
in specific places and among particular others who also inhabit them. Marris discusses how shared 
attachments give rise to individual and collective strategies for dealing with uncertainty (somewhat 
analogous to attachment psychology’s ‘styles’ of attachment). These come in distinct forms, such as 
solidarity with others, an orientation towards individualised autonomy, or withdrawal and disconnection. 
The erosion of shared attachments on which such strategies depend can therefore undermine the ways 
people share of living with an intrinsically uncertain future, and encourage them to develop other strategies. 
Also, Marris points out, changing strategies (particularly where solidarity is abandoned in favour of 
withdrawal or autonomy) can become self-undermining in some circumstances, producing more insecurity 
rather than reducing it.  In terms of Marris’s classification of strategies, a certain degree of ‘solidarity’ is 
implied in all attachment, as attachment is interdependence. In relation to place, this implicit solidarity is 
particularly evident. Maintaining the character of a place requires care from actors. Places, if they change 
their character, can then cease to sustain those who inhabit them, as the ‘secure space’ that makes embedded 
agency possible decays. With the loss of this secure space, the lived futures of its inhabitants may be 
undermined. 
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That environmental injustice relates to the loss of lived futures, and the disruptions of identity and agency 
that go with it, is implicit in documented cases of damage to place attachment. It is particularly evident in 
cases where change to the character of places stems from human intervention, and thus undermines broader 
expectations of trust that are rooted in attachments to shared ideals that agents of unwanted change are seen 
as having betrayed (Erikson, 1995; Edelstein, 2004a) .  
 
Writing of the increase in alcoholism, homelessness, and abusiveness in family relationships that followed 
toxic contamination of the tribal lands of the Ojibwa First Nation in Ontario, Canada, Kai Erikson (1995: 
35) describes a condition ‘that the usual sociological concepts – anomie, estrangement, alienation – are not 
rich enough to capture or reflect’. He interprets individual troubles as manifestations of a collective crisis 
caused by lost lived futures. Erikson elsewhere describes this communal condition of eroded futures as one 
where ‘“we” no longer exist as a connected pair or as linked cells in a larger communal body’ (Erikson, 
1976: 154). Lack of access to tribal lands and the practices connected to them eroded tribal members’ shared 
sense of a lived future and also the value of their own identities as members of the community.  
 
The kind of harm imposed on individuals and communities in such cases is not just a failure to recognise 
marginalised identities, i.e. the failure to recognise and value difference. It comes from the loss of the 
implicit interdependence of individual, community and place – a perhaps largely unspoken condition of 
‘solidarity’ between humans and the socio-natural places they inhabit. Witnesses to such losses are left 
scrambling to reform communal and individual strategies for dealing with uncertainty. Vanesa Castan Broto 
(2013: 8) quotes an environmental justice activist in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
‘[…] before the advent of industry, this area had clean rivers, open-air swimming pools, and 
parks where people could meet. However, with the advent and development of industry, 
everything was taken away from us.’ 
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Injustice is made tangible in such cases via descriptions given by people of the erosion of their sense of 
themselves as doers and actors. What is taken away from these residents is, essentially, the capacity to 
‘negotiat[e] a future for themselves and their children’ (Castan Broto, 2013: 9).  
 
Inhabitants of disrupted environments have to develop new strategies for dealing with uncertainty by re-
negotiating relationships with place, with each other, and with external agents of change. This may allow 
them to reconstitute identity and agency within places (by resisting or attempting to shape processes of 
change). Success in this would, however, require that implicit interdependence and solidarity between 
individual, community and place be made explicit and articulated as a common commitment. In Marris’ 
terms, such processes might lead on to the articulation of a new solidaristic strategy, as envisioned by 
Broto’s interviewees, some of whom articulated a hopeful future, but one conditional on polluting industries 
negotiating over the roles they could and should play in communities. Compensation, activists argued, 
would not be enough. Instead, a company would have to become ‘internalised’ within the community – 
joining it in creating a new form of active solidarity to transform the lived futures of community members.  
 
Often, however, only defensive responses are possible. Factions within communities are frequently driven 
into pursuing what (after Marris) could be called fragmented strategies of autonomy in pursuit of whatever 
forms of official recognition are offered to them (such as financial compensation). As Rob Nixon (2011: 65) 
notes in relation to Bhopal and Chernobyl, those affected ‘are thrust into a labyrinth of self-fashioning as 
they seek to fit their bodily stories to the story lines that dangle hope of recognition, (possibly, though 
elusively), even recompense’. Where even the pursuit of these forms of recognition is denied to 
communities, then they may find themselves caught in what Marris describes as strategies of withdrawal of 
one kind or another, as exemplified in the condition of the Ojibwa. Processes of disruptive and/or 
stigmatizing change can therefore be compounded by the responses that such disruption can encourage in 
the inhabitants of affected places.  
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The meaning of claims about environmental injustice that go beyond distribution may thus be read as claims 
about exclusion from a particular kind of subjectivity. This is an ecological, and implicitly solidaristic form 
that recognises the constitutive bonds between the body politic and the body of the world (Latta, 2007). This 
embeddedness of human communities and the subjects of which they are composed is more than simply 
material dependence. It is also the embeddedness of meanings, affects and emotions that serve as conditions 
of forms of identity and agency, whether individual and shared in nature, and which provide ways of making 
sense of and domesticating an uncertain future. Where the specific value of such meanings, affects and 
emotions is publically recognised, it becomes possible to speak of an acknowledged condition of ecological 
citizenship, a recognition of the interdependence between places and embodied subjects. Furthermore, this 
embedded citizenship must be seen as embedded in places in all their complexity, rather than simply relating 
to specific categories of place (such as ‘unspoilt’ locations), as is demonstrated by, for example, classic 
studies of urban slum clearance, from Gans (1982) to Fullilove (2004).  
Case study: the South Wales Gas Pipeline  
We now turn to an empirical study of how disrupted place attachment can undermine strategies for living 
with uncertainty. The South Wales Gas Pipeline (SWGP) project, including two LNG terminals to which it 
was connected at Milford Haven (MH) in west Wales, was constructed during 2003-2008. The pipeline 
construction work by National Grid and its subcontractors comprised two phases (see Figure 1), in addition 
to the construction of the terminals by other developers. The 120 km (75 miles) Phase 1 ran from Milford 
Haven to Aberdulais near Swansea. The 196 km (122 miles) Phase 2 ran from Felindre to Tirley in 
Gloucestershire, across the Wales-England border. The pipeline required above-ground installations (AGIs) 
at two points – at Cilfrew in the Swansea valley, near the junction of Phases 1 and 2, and at Tirley, where 
Phase 2 would be connected to the UK national gas grid. 
 
 
My research examined how those involved with community campaigns against the infrastructure 
experienced the project planning and construction processes, how these experiences related to their 
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motivations for campaigning, and how their sense of the future and what it held had changed in the period of 
their involvement and since. It comprised a series of 16 semi-structured narrative interviews (between 90 
and 180 minutes in length) during 2008 with members of campaign groups from ‘flash-point’ sites along the 
pipeline (see Table 1), including Safe Havens (Milford Haven and Waterston, the sites of the two terminals), 
CRA (Cilfrew Residents’ Association, concerned with an AGI), CRAG (Cwmtawe Residents’ Action 
Group, at Trebanos, concerned with Phase 1 of the pipeline), a looser group centring on Brecon and Hay-on-
Wye (concerned with Phase 2) and CAPRI (Campaign Against the Pressure Reduction Installation, at 
Tirley, concerned with another AGI). Interview material was qualitatively analysed and coded using NVivo 
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Table 1. Overview of interviews (with pseudonyms) 
Identifier Gender NS-SEC 
classification 
(5-class)  
Age Organisation Interviewee 
location 
Date 
Anna F Intermediate 55-64 CRA Cilfrew 22/07/08 
Ben M| Intermediate 55-64 Safe Havens Milford Haven  23/07/08 
Carl M Intermediate 45-54 CAPRI Tirley 24/07/08 
David M Higher 
managerial, 
administrative 
and professional 
55-64 Brecon 
activists 
Brecon 28/07/08 
Elin F Small employers 
and self-
employed 
35-44 Brecon 
activists 
Brecon (Hay-on-
Wye) 
28/07/08 
Frank M Small employers 
and self-
employed 
25-34 Brecon 
activists 
Brecon 29/07/08 
Gareth M Higher 
managerial, 
administrative 
and professional 
55-64 Brecon 
activists 
Brecon 29/07/08 
Harriet F Semi-routine 45-54 CRAG Trebanos 30/07/08 
Ian M Full-time 
student 
15-24 Independent Trebanos  30/07/08 
Julie F Intermediate 65+ CAPRI Tirley 31/07/08 
Karen F Semi-routine 25-34 Safe Havens Milford Haven 
(Waterston) 
31/07/08 
Leonard M Higher 
professional 
55-64 CAPRI Tirley 01/08/08 
Maggie F Intermediate 35-44 CRA Cilfrew 15/10/08 
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Due to its multi-phase nature, no environmental impact assessment (EIA) was legally required for the whole 
project (a decision that meant there was little scope to publicly challenge the need for the project as a whole, 
and which was questioned by the Brecon Beacons National Park Authority and others). Different phases of 
construction were announced, publicised for consultation and then implemented  at different times, meaning 
that campaigns against different elements of the project failed initially to link up to address issues that would 
often prove to be shared concerns. In publicity materials, National Grid (2005) described the project as a 
necessary response to an inevitable increase in gas demand through to 2015, and thus as a matter of national 
energy security. Localised benefits, in the shape of jobs for communities (and, as it later transpired, financial 
payments for community projects), were also promised. Distrust of the developers emerged in response to 
what interviewees reported to be late communication and one-way consultations, as well as in response to 
what was felt to be overlooked potential localised threats to safety relating both to the construction and the 
operation of the infrastructure. Distrust and perceived threats formed the initial foci for campaigns, later 
becoming their main public focus. However, interviews revealed that people’s interpretations of the harms 
they associated with the infrastructure were multifaceted and complex.  
 
It proved difficult for campaigners to participate in decision-making processes. Their narratives in 
interviews touched on different aspects of the loss of anticipated futures provided by secure place and 
community attachments, including the reliable expectations and anchoring ideals associated with these 
attachments. Translating such concerns into forms that would be legitimate at planning enquiries was a 
challenge. As time went on, campaigners began to make links between local concerns and ones (such as the 
imposition of risks on Welsh communities for the advantage of English ones, and anthropogenic global 
Neil M Higher 
managerial, 
administrative 
and professional 
45-54 CAPRI Tirley 16/10/08 
Olivia F Unemployed 25-34 CRAG Trebanos 24/10/08 
Penny F Intermediate 35-44 Brecon 
activists 
Brecon 19/11/08 
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warming) that related to regional, national and global scales. However, they found that, as it was relatively 
late in the day, these objections also achieved little traction, particularly as no scope for challenging the 
project at a strategic level had been allowed.  
 
Campaigners’ experiences reflect more general characteristics of the politics of planning in the UK. 
Following privatisation, the UK energy industry underwent decentralisation followed by recentralisation 
around particular ‘centres of calculation’, including utility companies, regulators like the Office for Gas and 
Electricity Markets (OfGEM), and transmission network operators (TNOs) like National Grid, who are 
responsible for assessing risk both strategically (e.g. in relation to energy demand forecasts) and in relation 
to site-specific infrastructure (Groves et al, 2013).  
 
Recentralisation has done little to change established dynamics within the planning system, such as the ways 
in which the impacts of projects tend to be considered far ‘downstream’ and disconnected from strategic 
priorities (Cowell, 2010), or the emergence of conflicts between strategic priorities and locally-defined 
conceptions of goods or bads (Bristow et al., 2012). Such dynamics appear to be reflected in assumptions 
among TNO representatives about the public’s inability to understand and therefore to take a meaningful 
role in consultations on the strategic significance of network projects like pipelines (Cotton and Devine-
Wright, 2010). 
 
In contrast to the relatively well-defined and quantifiable strategic and site-specific risks communicated by 
National Grid and other developers in their communications about developments, non-quantifiable, complex 
uncertainties were at the heart of many concerns expressed by campaigners in describing the hazards and 
resulting insecurity they felt the project had imposed upon them. These uncertainties derived from sources 
such as unforeseeable third-party action or complex interactions between risks associated with different 
pieces of infrastructure, which were felt to have been ignored in official risk assessments provided by 
developers (Groves et al, 2013: 350-1). Difficulties campaigners experienced with obtaining information 
about infrastructure plans from National Grid compounded these uncertainties.  
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Other uncertainties not directly related to risk were also significant, however. At Brecon, Elin looked ahead 
to the completion of the pipeline – present, yet absent because of its invisibility – and described it as 
promising a stigmatised future that would erode her anticipated, lived futures, representing the pipeline as ‘a 
huge serpent’ that ‘goes through every single room of my house’. Here, the meaning of the pipeline itself 
placed in question the character of place attachments. The infrastructure came to stand as a synecdoche for 
uncertainties that remain beyond influence and which therefore disrupt the past, present and most of all, the 
future – the narratives of individuals and communities. We now turn to explore interviewees’ motivations 
for and experiences of campaigning in relation to these kinds of uncertainties, which relate specifically to 
the changing meaning of attachments.  
 
Attachment and motivations for campaigns 
Place attachment is not necessarily positive. Ambivalence characterised relationships to place in Milford 
Haven, Waterston, Trebanos and Cilfrew, where experiences of stigma were described by several 
interviewees in relation to waves of unwanted development and continuing markers of social deprivation, 
like unemployment and incidence of long-term limiting illness. Such consciousness of stigma is common 
across post-industrial communities in the south and south-west of Wales that have historically attracted 
significant polluting infrastructure (cf. Cotton, 2014). In such locations, the biophysical world may, as much 
as the social, be experienced as untrustworthy (Edelstein, 2004). Ill-health, for example, is experienced as 
intimately connected to place. Ben, for example, discussed a condition known locally as ‘the Milford cough’ 
caused, sufferers suspect, by particulates from nearby petrochemical plants, a background phenomenon of a 
kind that, as Bush et al. (2001) note, creates stigma even in the absence of specific pollution incidents. In 
Trebanos, the instability of the mountain on the slopes of which the community lives formed another such 
backdrop to interviewees’ descriptions of place. The background presence of mineworkings - ‘thousands of 
small mines, […] a lot of them have never been documented really’ (Harriet) - is keenly felt: ‘where we are 
is too dangerous’ (Olivia).  Less ambivalent and often more positive attachments to place are found in 
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Brecon and Tirley, where a great deal of anger was caused by the possibility that the sudden imposition of 
industrial infrastructure upon an environment felt to be characterised by continuity across generations would 
stigmatise communities (Leonard).  
 
Even if place attachments proved ambivalent, however, what united interviewees generally was their 
affirmation of the significance of place as a communal environment that sustained strong threads of personal 
attachments. Karen, from Waterston near Milford Haven, noted that she and her partner moved there 
because they felt it would be ‘better for the children’ than the city they had come from. It was ‘a country 
village, it was quiet, no traffic, it didn’t even have [street]lights’. Despite the uncomfortable presence, less 
than a mile away, of a petrochemical plant (built in the 1950s), the source of smells and noise, rural 
landscapes could be reached easily via back lanes and ‘quiet roads, you know there’s a playpark that way, 
they [the children] can go mix, mingle with the children from the village’.  
 
At Trebanos, CRAG’s campaign was motivated initially by uncertainties associated with explosives being 
used as part of pipeline construction works. But several houses and a school in the area had previously been 
severely affected by subsidence (Harriet). The broader local context was, therefore, one of gradually 
growing insecurity, an experience of shaken attachment that nevertheless awakened solidarity. Initial fears 
about blasting evoked cultural memories of previous disasters associated with the environmental effects of 
industrialisation. ‘[A]nother Aberfan’ (Olivia, a reference to the South Wales village where a spoil tip 
collapse in 1966 killed 144 people) was viewed as a real possibility. 
 
In Cilfrew, an AGI was opposed because of uncertainties surrounding the nature and seriousness of potential 
explosion hazards. But concerns also focused on how development might disrupt what the village’s 
inhabitants felt was the rural character that distinguishes it from the towns and peri-urban settlements 
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nearby. Despite ‘faultiness’ and stigma, manifested in a higher than average level of economic inactivity and 
long-term limiting illness among the population, good local facilities (schools, post office, shops) and 
rurality contributed to an environment felt by one interviewee to be a source of community identity and 
resilience. 
We've got nothing, we're a very, very quiet area, we've never had anything, the only thing we've 
ever had is the fact that we're rural, that you can walk outside your door and you're in country, 
you're in total country (Anna). 
 
Such narratives centring on present and previous insults did not characterise interviews from Brecon and 
Tirley. Instead, in these localities, pipeline infrastructure was represented as a sudden and unacceptable 
encroachment of industrial society into areas which had remained relatively free of it, and indeed in the case 
of Brecon, expressly preserved from it by the Brecon Beacons’ protected status: ‘what were they doing in a 
National Park?’ (Frank). Nonetheless, in all cases, whether stigma was present or not, campaigns were 
begun in the name of communal solidarity and reliance understood as anchored in specific places. 
Experiences of disruption and loss 
We now turn to explore how ongoing disruption to environments and threats of stigma can erode agency and 
identity in specific ways described by campaigners. This effect, with both individual and collective 
dimensions, was related by interviewees both to ongoing construction work and to imagined possible 
futures, ones given weight by specific uncertainties associated with infrastructure. Disruption was 
experienced and potential stigma made concrete through their effect on attachment to environments, whether 
attachment was positive or more ambivalent.  
 
In Waterston, Karen reported that the balance between an increasingly troubling ‘background’ of 
infrastructure and the ‘foreground’ of everyday life had been tilted. Construction traffic (‘diggers coming in, 
the width of the road’) along the main road, which previously had been ‘used to drive cows down [...] from 
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field to field’, threatened not just safety but also ‘family life’, creating a situation where ‘I have to lock my 
children in the house’. She and the community experienced, she felt, the loss of any ability to maintain their 
environment. When the village campaign to halt construction failed, this opened fault-lines in the strategy of 
solidarity it had initially created. Many individuals gave up the campaign, pursuing instead examples of 
Marris’ strategies of autonomy such as taking jobs at the new plant or moving away.  
 
At the same time, the presence of uncertain risks prevented other residents from pursuing such strategies. 
The failure of the community’s campaign represented a failure of collective agency. Karen saw in her and 
her partner’s failure to leave Waterston a further erosion of agency, symbolised by falling house prices in 
the village. ‘I’ve got no rights, absolutely no rights here at all. I feel very stuck here, I do.’ The failure of 
both a strategy of collective solidarity and one of individual autonomy marked a point where the imposition 
of disruption and insecurity on people in the area seemed to have become a source of irremediable self-
stigmatization (Corrigan, 1998): ‘I think it’s a poor area, I don’t think they think they’re worth that much. 
You can see that everywhere you go here.’ 
 
In Trebanos, pipeline construction was also experienced as degrading collective control over community 
environments. Valued community land was lost: the pipeline route crossed ‘a lot of council land, common 
land, forestry’ before crossing a playing field that ‘had been given to Neath Port Talbot [council] to be held 
in trust by the Playing Fields Association’ (Harriet). Failure to get these dimensions of impact recognised 
within the planning process led to splits within CRAG over strategy. As at Waterston, fractured solidarity 
led many campaigners to pursue individual autonomy instead – a shift of strategy that tended, again, to 
collapse, as at Waterston. Once again, the deep disruption of the link between place and agency was 
symbolized by falling property prices. The pipeline established a link, it was felt, between Trebanos and 
other stigmatized ‘faulty environments’ in the region: 
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A lot of people have kept quiet because they’re more concerned about their property losing value 
– there’s another area of landslip a few miles over there, called Panteg, […] and there a lot of 
properties have been condemned, and the values of the properties are much lower [...] (Harriet). 
At Cilfrew, the AGI blocked free public access to March Hywel mountain, on whose lower eastern slopes 
the village is built. This was experienced as symbolic of the deepening of the existing stigma suffered by the 
community. It was felt that the AGI would disrupt the deeper emotional contours of the landscape and its 
contribution both to community identity and to the forms of life felt to be central to living there. 
But when you go up to March Hywel Mountain, which is practically a sacred mountain around 
here, up here you looking smack at it. So that area, we used to go up there, it's God's own 
country, you look out and you can see nothing, only mountains all way across to Brecon. That's 
been totally destroyed (Anna). 
Once again, a failed campaign produced splits in the community, and a re-orientation for many away from 
solidarity towards autonomy. Some residents left the area – with difficulty. Again, barriers to selling one’s 
home erected by stigma were felt to be symbolic of exhausted agency: ‘[t]hey had to move, they had to sell 
their house, they were lucky enough to sell it’ (Maggie). 
 
 In Tirley, CAPRI’s collective campaign against hazards associated with a planned AGI was, for a time, 
successful. Despite its eventual failure, the community was left with a sense of pride in its ability to organise 
a strategy of solidarity rooted in a shared evaluation of place (Leonard), but also sorrow at the changing 
character of the area and at its suddenly undomesticated future: ‘[y]ou put it on the back burner, but it's not 
going to go away is it?’ (Julie). Around Brecon, interviewees linked the threat of stigma strongly to visual 
evidence of questionable engineering practices (David), to how National Grid was felt not to have dealt 
appropriately with questions regarding risk (Gareth) and with dangerous incidents during construction 
(Frank).  
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For Frank, the threat of stigma was most significant in relation to the land inherited through his wife’s 
family and which his family now managed: ‘you plough a lot of energy of your life into a place that you 
hope the children might continue after you’. This feeling of continuity was also connected to a historical and 
cultural context of cooperation between local landowners in looking after the land. The pipeline was 
constructed quickly to meet contractual obligations, Frank observed, and so landowners were offered 
financial incentives to allow construction, a factor that had created disagreements locally.  
 
Having accepted payment himself, Frank expressed regret at this move from a strategy of solidarity to one 
of autonomy. He described the shift as leaving behind ‘a bomb in our backyard’, and had ‘certainly changed 
the way we feel about living here.’ As in other locations, moving away was felt to represent a residual form 
of private agency, in the absence of effective collective agency. At the same time, and ironically, Frank 
experienced a remaining solidaristic tie between family and land, which linked place attachment with 
attachment to ideals and moral duty (a ‘heritage millstone’), as an obstruction to this strategy of autonomy. 
 
Also in Brecon, Elin saw the presence of the pipeline most emphatically as an invasion of an extended, 
emotionally-significant environment in which her business life and private life were both heavily invested: 
[...] it really has broken my heart, you know? And I would say it's a bit like somebody who had a 
beautiful house, and it became occupied by a huge serpent, and unfortunately it just became 
occupied by this large serpent and unfortunately it goes through every single room of my house. 
There isn't one piece left here. I had all these rooms in the countryside, all my most precious 
places, and that pipeline had gone through every single one of them. 
She described the experience of campaigning in terms that recall Nussbaum’s (2001) description of 
mourning as revolving around ‘enormous significance, permanently removed’, and around the work of 
remodelling the world and the self to reconstitute a secure space in which identity and effective agency 
could be reclaimed. ‘You know what it’s like when you’re going through something, when things make 
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sense, you may be able to move on and let it go’. 
Discussion 
Interviewees recounted various experiences of loss, which related primarily to disruption of place 
attachment occasioned by actual or threatened stigma – stigma arising from either uncertain hazards, or from 
the contribution of development to changes in place character. But these experiences were also of the loss of 
valued strategies for dealing with uncertainty. Attempts to respond to imposed change transformed implicit 
strategies of solidarity into explicit ones, among at least some community members, leading them to 
explicitly identify and defend attachments. Where campaigns were unsuccessful, however, these strategies 
were eroded. The links between community and place that served to buttress collective agency were 
undermined, even where a sense of pride at achievements was reported. The experience of loss witnessed 
particularly in the comments from Elin and Karen above expresses, therefore, the failure of a strategy for 
living with uncertainty that is conditioned by bonds between collectivities and individuals, on the one hand, 
and between collectivities or individuals and places on the other. 
 
These experiences of loss were often narrated explicitly as injustices, arising from acts perpetrated upon 
them. 
That’s the biggest harm that’s been done to this village is that they now feel oppressed. Before 
there was a glimmer of hope that if something was wrong you could get it righted, whereas 
they’ve lost that, yeah that expectations been taken away (Maggie). 
The injustice articulated here is undoubtedly one of recognition, but is not a failure to recognise a defined, 
fixed identity. Instead, there has been a failure to recognise a group as ‘doers and actors’ trying to articulate 
explicitly the implicit, embedded solidarity that they sense to be embedded within a given environment, and 
which – as Broto’s (2015) interviewees make clear – may be linked to a more hopeful future, given 
opportunities for more extensive participation in both local and strategic decision-making. As time went on, 
participants often came to see campaigns as interventions that extended beyond local hazards. They were 
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seen as offering a future (however unlikely) that would be fundamentally different from the present and past, 
a future that would depend upon a range of actors (including communities, energy companies, local councils 
and the Welsh Government) entering into new, more democratic relationships which actualised some form 
of explicit solidarity around the value of places. 
 
Underlying claims about injustice, about failures to recognise the embedded nature of ‘doing and acting’, is 
what I referred to earlier as the ‘colonisation of attachment’ through which the capability for domesticating 
the future sustained by place attachment is threatened. Attachment is a process through which an uncertain 
future is tamed and made liveable in the present through the creation of affective bonds of trust and 
attendant expectations about how the world should be. Attachments are thus a way of giving shape to the 
future that encourage particular ways of acting in the present – strategies for living with uncertainty. As we 
have seen, disruption to place and the threat of (new or increased) stigma threaten to impose a new 
projected, lived future upon those which have been moulded, over time, through attachments. Such 
impositions are themselves driven by specific strategies for dealing with uncertainty that are employed by 
actors (such as National Grid) who are concerned with managing the future, having been invested with the 
authority to assist in governing risks (defined primarily at the national scale, as with energy insecurity). 
What Giddens (1991) has described as ‘the colonisation of the future’, the capacity of actors to map 
uncertainties as risks and thus shape strategies in the present, is here revealed to be a political, unequal 
enterprise.  
 
Such strategies, in their relation to ‘local’ lived futures, recall what Nixon (2011: 17) has described as the 
relationship between ‘official’, gridded, abstract maps of a standardised landscape that governance often 
imposes upon the dynamic, ‘vernacular’ landscape of places as they are emotionally and symbolically 
meaningful to those who inhabit and move through them every day. Applying Nixon’s distinction 
temporally is important for our attempt here to understand environmental injustice through the lens of 
attachment and uncertainty. The ‘maps’ of expected costs and benefits that are constructed as part of risk 
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governance are maps of the future, which are anchored to maps of space. Armed with such ‘future maps’, 
actors can employ strategies of autonomy which exploit planning governance, enabling them to  
decisively and speedily shape the future territory on which less agile and capable others [will] 
later have to make decisions and deal with consequences (Groves, 2013: 194).  
 
Risk defines strategic need, and thus initiates ‘planning cascades’ (Owens, 2004) in which the only issues 
communities can comment on are localised safety risks, defined and quantified as part of environmental 
impact assessments. The discourse of safety risk through which ‘material concerns’ are expressed in the 
planning system balances hazards against prospective benefits, which are typically expressed in equally 
quantified terms (numbers of jobs, community payments).  
 
Planning governance, in its reliance on risk, rewards actors (such as developers) who are able to marshal the 
requisite expertise with considerable room for manoeuvre in framing and justifying their intentions. It 
simultaneously minimizes the agency of others, and crowds out the futures they, for their part, envision and 
anticipate. Those able to input assessments of uncertainty to decision-making processes cast in terms of 
quantitative risk, and thus sanitised of other discourses that define value in non-quantifiable terms, therefore 
enjoy strategic advantages over those for whom the future is primarily tangible through specific investments 
in place and other attachments (Bauman, 2005).  
 
Decisions justified through the calculative mapping of a future terrain of risks and benefits, therefore create 
zones of certainty for some actors. The creation of such zones, however, both produces new uncertainties 
and tends to transfer them onto the shoulders of others (Vail, 1999), who struggle to translate their suddenly 
uncertain futures into the language of risk, which is nevertheless the only language they are officially 
permitted to speak (Jensen, 2006). The SWGP interview material documents such processes, showing how 
the disruption of place attachments undermines identity and agency. It demonstrates how community 
members experience planning processes as failing to recognise both attachments that matter to them,1 and 
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the forms of agency, the strategies for living with uncertainty, that are sustained by these attachment 
relationships. It shows how this lack of recognition translates into campaigns that are attempts to articulate 
‘what matters’, and finally, it shows how failures to obtain recognition for what matters leads to the erosion 
of both identity and of agency, and even the adoption by campaigners of strategies which impose further 
losses (as in the adoption of failing strategies of autonomy). With the concept ‘colonisation of attachment’, I 
designate the failure of governance to recognise attachment and the agency it sustains, together with the 
ways in which risk-based governance allows powerful actors to effectively exploit, for strategic advantage, 
the ways of living with uncertainty on which place-dependent communities rely.  
Conclusion 
If attachment is a constitutive part of how people inhabit particular environments, then the ripple effects of 
stigma and/or disruption on place attachment can spread out to dislocate the individual’s and/or a 
collectivity’s sense of being part of a meaningful ethical, and ultimately metaphysical, order. This is as true 
of non-indigenous communities as of indigenous ones, as is suggested both by theoretical accounts of the 
importance of attachment, and by the empirical case study of the colonisation of attachment presented 
above. 
 
I have argued that these effects both motivate and give specific meaning to claims about environmental 
injustice. Such injustices arise from a failure to recognise and support agency along with the individual and 
collective attachments, which sustain it.  My case study confirms an insight originating with Marris (1996), 
that  the impact of the colonisation of attachment can affect the relational capabilities of individuals and 
collectives, constraining them under some conditions into developing strategies for living with insecurity 
(such as fragile attempts to realise autonomy).  Over time, these strategies further impair these capacities, a 
point mirrored by findings on the effects of stigma from social psychology (Corrigan, 1998).  
 
The injustice thus done is one of oppression and domination – an erosion of capabilities that support the 
power to influence one’s future (Young, 1990). These capabilities are relational ones that connect 
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individuals and/or communities to places, and thereby also embed them dynamically in the biophysical 
world. If justice is the key virtue of the ‘body politic’, then a political perspective sensitive to environmental 
injustice is one able to recognise when attachment, this body’s connective tissue, is torn. Colonisation of 
attachment provides a way to think about how the substance of claims of environmental injustice should be 
understood. They are claims about the erosion of forms of agency embedded in attachments to places and 
collectives that posit individuals as ecological citizens.  
 
The urge to articulate what cannot easily be articulated and yet still perhaps matters most of all is both 
empowering and debilitating, when entering public fora in which such values cannot readily be represented. 
The struggle to translate values into the language of the colonists of attachments may fracture opposition 
and render it ineffective, particularly for communities that are unable to invoke countervailing 
environmental justice discourses such as that of cultural recognition, as employed by indigenous 
movements.  The great achievement of indigenous peoples and the environmental justice movements they 
have formed is to begin to create forums in which new legal instruments may make possible the public 
recognition of attachments. What I have shown is that discourses of environmental justice need to 
acknowledge the connections between individual and shared attachments and agency, the ways in which 
agency is tied to the domestication of uncertainty, and how attachment, while being the basis of agency, is 
also fragile in the face of the ways of mapping the future privileged by risk-based governance. 
Understanding environmental justice is not simply about the recognition of identity, but more about the 
recognition of ecological citizenship, the ways in which the embeddedness of individuals and communities 
in specific places enables them to be doers and actors in an uncertain world. 
Notes 
1
 National Grid has since produced a set of design guidelines influenced by the need to recognise place 
attachment, although these are only relevant to overhead power lines (National Grid, 2011). 
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Figure 1: LNG Terminals, Phase 1 and Phase 2 of South Wales Gas Pipeline (source: Google 
Earth). 
 
